By Jack Thompson ’27

In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Chevron v. NRDC that when a law written by Congress is unclear, courts should usually trust the government agency (e.g. the EPA or USDA) in charge of enforcing that law to interpret it. The underlying idea is that an agency has expertise in its policy arena, so it’s better equipped to figure out how to execute a law. At the end of its 2024 term, the decided Lober Bright v. Raimondo, officially overturning Chevron. With Chevron’s demise, judges are suddenly responsible for interpreting vague laws written by Congress, instead of relying on agency interpretations.
The Chevron ruling was seen as the only thing protecting federal agencies from courts writing regulations on their behalf. In other words, if Congress tells the EPA to set reasonable limits on air pollutants, but neglects to define “air pollutants” and “reasonable limits,” Chevron says that courts should defer to how the EPA and its experts define those terms. This doctrine was widely hailed as a lifesaver for lower courts, which were inundated with vast amounts of agency interpretation cases. However, Chevron had long been in the crosshairs of conservative legal outlets like the Federalist Society. Justice Neil Gorsuch, particularly, has been waiting for a chance to expunge Chevron for years, celebrating the death of a “revolution masquerading as the status quo.”
After the decision to kill Chevron, pundits wondered aloud about the future of the American executive branch, envisioning a future where Trump appointees would wander around with a roving commission to overturn agency actions that were displeasing to them politically. This would lead to the judiciary co-opting the power of the executive branch. And while a theoretical judge could absolutely use Loper to kill agency actions, those who lamented the death of Chevron seem to have overestimated how much more work district court judges are willing and interested to do.
So, if judges don’t want to take on more work, but Chevron is dead, how can courts continue deferring to agencies? A nearly 30-year-old case offers a solution. In 1996, the Court took the case Auer v. Robbins under consideration. This created a new tool called Auer deference (known in some circles as Seminole Rock deference). Auer differs from Chevron in its scope: Chevron allows judicial deference for agency interpretations of statute (legislative text passed by Congress). Auer, on the other hand, allows judges to defer to how an agency interprets its own regulation, having little to do with statute (i.e. the Department of Veteran Affairs deciding how to interpret its own VA regulations on providing disability benefits). Auer serves a much broader purpose and is used more often than Chevron in lower courts.
The Court had an opportunity to plant a knife firmly in Auer in 2019 in the case Kisor v. Wilkie. They opted not to do so, citing the destabilizing effect that tossing Auer would have in lower courts. In contrast, the majority that killed Chevron had no such concerns.
But Kisor does not signal the end of Auer’s troubles. There are plenty of willing accomplices in academia who see Auer as subversive of the separation between law-making and law-executing powers. Justice Scalia, who authored the opinion in Auer, also called for its revisitation before his death. Scalia believed that Auer, in practice, created an incentive for agencies to draft purposefully vague regulations, thereby increasing their flexibility in execution and, most importantly, their own power.
Still, why didn’t the Court’s conservatives take a shot at Auer? In Loper, the Court took issue with the process used by courts to identify ambiguous statutes. The test, traditionally, put the burden on the judge to identify when a statute was too vague for an agency to execute. Based on this issue, it is not difficult to see a world in which Auer’s ambiguities also become a target.
While critics argue that Auer leads to agency power grabs, Auer’s reaffirmation in Kisor established guardrails for lower courts that will counterbalance this incentive. For example, an agency cannot change its interpretation of the word “reasonable” in its own regulations on a whim; courts would be well within their rights to strike this down. This and other reviewable standards leave courts with several tools to use to oversee the agencies.
Many have commented that Auer deference may not be in immediate danger with this Court. There are plenty of articulated arguments for its demise, but those sharpening their knives will likely need to wait a little longer. In the meantime, we haven’t seen an explosion of so-called judicial policymaking (e.g. Heller’s expansion of gun rights in 2010) post-Chevron, and this trend will likely continue. Though a trite observation, it warrants repeating that lower courts are prone to avoiding drawn-out fights with the government over regulations. The sky has yet to fall, and the uneasy balancing act between the judiciary and bureaucracy will continue. For now.

