Opium Wars Redux: D.C.’s Failure to Stem the Tide of Fentanyl Precursors

By Naveen Wineland ’27
Managing Editor, Ike’s Anvil

Naveen Wineland ’27

When the British Empire waged war on China in the 1840s to protect its opium profits, it weaponized addiction as a tool of imperial power. Two centuries later, the world’s roles have inverted: the United States, once the moral critic of that era, now struggles against a tidal wave of fentanyl flowing from abroad, this time with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the key supplier. 

The opioid epidemic claimed over 806,000 American lives between 1999 and 2023, more deaths than all U.S. post-World War II military deaths combined. This epidemic unfolded in three waves: a surge in prescription opioids in the late 1990s; a second wave in 2010 with increased heroin use; and a third wave starting in 2013 with the introduction of fentanyl. The fentanyl stage has been the deadliest. Fentanyl is roughly 50-100 times stronger than morphine, and most fentanyl deaths are accidental, caused by users unaware of its potency or presence. In 2023, synthetic opioids made up 69% of all drug overdoses. The critical distinction with the third wave of the opioid epidemic is that the crisis has become geopolitical in nature: China is the source of the precursor chemicals that made America’s fentanyl epidemic possible.  

Investigations by the U.S. Congress’ House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and independent think tanks reveal that the CCP has subsidized, rewarded, and outright owned chemical companies tied to fentanyl production. For example, Shanghai’s Minhang District provides export credit premiums and insurance, forms of subsidization, to support the Shanghai Ruizheng Chemical Technology company, widely known for advertising its fentanyl products on Alibaba, China’s equivalent of Amazon. Other companies, including Gaosheng Chemical and Amarall Biotech, have received provincial awards or direct support from organizations affiliated with the PRC’s Ministry of Science and Technology. One U.S. House review of the Chinese internet found over 31,000 instances of Chinese companies selling chemicals with drug-trafficking ties on a mere seven e-commerce sites alone, and in 2019, the PRC had individualized subsidies for 14+ fentanyl precursors. 

Washington’s response to Chinese fentanyl precursors has relied on the illusion of cooperation with China. For years, U.S. policy has centered on persuading the PRC to act responsibly, whether through bilateral counternarcotics negotiations or, more recently, tariff threats meant to change behavior. These efforts rest on a dangerously false assumption: that the CCP is a good-faith actor in solving a problem it helped create in the first place. Aside from directly supporting the fentanyl trade, the Chinese have also engaged in a mix of malicious compliance and criminal negligence. The Chinese have blocked U.S. IP addresses from accessing sites that Chinese companies commonly use to get export rebates for narcotics production. It took until November 2023 for the PRC to publicly issue a notice to the Chinese chemical industry that producing or exporting precursors was illegal, years after American negotiators requested the Chinese start taking the issue more seriously. It is clear that current strategy is not working, and the U.S. government needs to attack the issue at the source to truly curb fentanyl. Current U.S. policy is also heavily concentrated on direct U.S. border measures and trying to resolve the issue exclusively with Mexico, a mere stop-gap measure, especially considering huge amounts of fentanyl flow into the U.S. through legal ports of entry. 

If the PRC refuses to act in good faith, the U.S. must stop treating the fentanyl crisis as a law enforcement issue and start treating it as a strategic threat. This means shifting from negotiation and attempted cooperation to targeted, unilateral enforcement. One existing model for this is the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA). Passed in 2021, the UFLPA blocks imports linked to forced labor in China’s Xinjiang Region. Its power lies in “rebuttable presumption,” treating any product made wholly or partly in Xinjiang as tainted by coercion or slave labor and sanctioning any company that continued to do business with Xinjiang without proving no wrongdoing first. This “guilty until proven innocent” approach framework successfully changed corporate behavior, as companies such as Gap, Old Navy, and H&M who operate in public with traceable supply chains, were forced into compliance. 

There are already current pieces of legislation dedicated to stopping fentanyl precursor production in China, though those have not gone far enough. The Stop Chinese Fentanyl Act of 2025, which amends the standing Fentanyl Sanctions Act to make Chinese companies more easily sanctionable for failing to prevent opioid trafficking, has yet to pass the Senate. That act can be roped into a comprehensive package dedicated to directly targeting the Chinese subsidies regiment and network of fentanyl precursor corporations. 

The UFLPA framework can be replicated to deal with the fentanyl trade. However, this would require a much more comprehensive framework. Unlike apparel and cotton, synthetic opioids such as fentanyl and precursor chemicals flow through opaque, fragmented supply chains, and are hidden behind shell companies and state-tolerated exporters. It’s much easier to sanction a multinational clothing brand with storefronts and shareholders than a chemical manufacturer using false documentation and proxy distributors that have already, on paper, been shut down multiple times. The creation of rebuttable presumption on imports of fentanyl precursors would affect U.S. multinationals who help support the fentanyl trade. U.S. importers would need to demonstrate, through rigorous end-use verification and chain-of-custody verification, that the chemicals they are importing are for legitimate pharmaceutical or industrial purposes. 

For example, the U.S. government could create a list of fentanyl precursors (NPP, ANPP, 1-boc-4-piperidone,) that automatically trigger the presumption list and creates red flags for U.S. law enforcement. This approach shifts the burden of proof to importers, allowing the U.S. to act unilaterally without waiting for Beijing’s cooperation. Combining increased enforcement and intelligence-sharing with Mexico, where most fentanyl is synthesized from Chinese inputs, can help choke the flow into the United States. 

In the 19th century, the West flooded China with opium to keep it weak and compliant. Today, the roles are reversed: it is the United States that suffers an addiction crisis fueled by Chinese chemical exports. The U.S. cannot afford to rely on good faith from the PRC anymore – it needs to act decisively to cut off fentanyl at the source. Current actions are too focused on the border and Mexico’s role in the opioid epidemic, without resolving the root causes of the current wave of fentanyl deaths. 

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